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GOULD, HULL, AND THE INDIVIDUATION OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
 
Abstract.  
When is conceptual change so significant that we should talk about a new theory, not a new 
version of the same theory? We address this problem here, starting from Gould’s discussion 
of the individuation of the Darwinian theory. He locates his position between two extremes: 
‘minimalist’ – a theory should be individuated merely by its insertion in a historical lineage 
– and ‘maximalist’ – exhaustive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions are required for 
individuation. He imputes the minimalist position to Hull and attempts a reductio: this 
position leads us to give the same ‘name’ to contradictory theories. Gould’s ‘structuralist’ 
position requires both ‘conceptual continuity’ and descent for individuation. Hull’s attempt 
to assimilate into his general selectionist framework Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplar’ and the 
‘semantic’ view of the structure of scientific theories can be used to counter Gould’s 
reductio, and also to integrate structuralist and population thinking about conceptual 
change. 
Keywords: Theory – Individuation – Selectionism – Structuralism. 
 
1. Introduction 
The problem of the structure and individuation of scientific theories has been a 
central one in contemporary philosophy of science. Logical empiricists reconstructed 
scientific theories as linguistic objects, individuated by their logical structure and the 
semantics of the languages that constitute those objects. It is well known that, as a result of 
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this approach, the meaning of theoretical terms became one of the chief problems for their 
program. 
 Popper’s critique of logical empiricism downplayed semantic issues and focused, 
instead, on methodology. Lakatos tried, in the 1960’s, to assimilate the so-called historicist 
turn in the philosophy of science into the general framework of Popperianism. From a 
historicist perspective, it became pretty obvious that the conceptual units to be appraised 
should be more inclusive: series of theories, programs, or what have you. These units are 
understood as having an explicit dynamical dimension, being irreducible to isolated and 
static theories, as conceived by the ‘received view’. 
Given that new focus on the dynamics of scientific knowledge, it is not surprising 
that the characterization of the units of appraisal became, thereafter, one of the fundamental 
problems of ‘post-positivist’ philosophy of science. If we take into account the historical 
and social dimensions of scientific activity – instead of just reconstructing scientific 
knowledge in terms of inferential and semantic relations –, this problem turns out to be a 
very complex one. 
In this paper, we will focus our attention on the following question: Can an 
evolutionary approach make us see the problem of the units of appraisal under a new light? 
We take as a starting point the more restricted problem of the individuation of the 
Darwinian theory, as formulated by Stephen Jay Gould in The Structure of Evolutionary 
Theory (2002). Gould faces this problem because of its relation to an important issue in 
current evolutionary biology. This science is undergoing a theoretical change and it raises 
the inevitable question of whether this is a change within the boundaries of Darwinism, or it 
may result in an entirely new evolutionary theory, a ‘post-Darwinian’, or even an ‘anti-
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Darwinian’ theory. Gould argues that the current versions of evolutionary theory cannot be 
regarded as ‘anti-Darwinian’, but, to do so, he understands he has to tackle the 
philosophical problem of the nature and individuation of scientific theories in general. 
Since Gould faces this problem by engaging in polemics with David Hull, we will 
subsequently discuss the selectionist theory of science developed by this philosopher. 
Finally, we will compare their views, situating this discussion in the context of significant 
trends in contemporary philosophy of science. We will also suggest an avenue for further 
developments. 
 
2. Gould on the individuation of theories 
Making use of architectural metaphors, Gould argues that the “foundations” of 
Darwinism are preserved, despite changes in its “structure”, particularly in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century. As a consequence, we would have now a theory that 
remains within the domain of the Darwinian “logic”, but must be construed as basically 
different from the “canonical theory of natural selection” (Gould, 2002, p.3). 
For Gould, it is possible to identify a “central core” that remained intact in 
Darwinism, despite the changes in the framework of the theory (Ibid., pp. 6, 166). To 
demonstrate this continuity, Gould thinks it is necessary “... to describe a construct like 
‘evolutionary theory’ as a genuine ‘thing’ – an entity with discrete boundaries and a 
definable history” (Ibid., p. 6). For him, to conceive a theory as a thing means to ascribe to 
it a historical continuity, the nature of a lineage, but also to consider it as an entity with 
“defining properties of anatomical form” (Ibid. id.). From this perspective, Gould launches 
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a critical appraisal of Hull’s characterization of theories as just lineages. He emphasizes the 
role of structuralist thinking, arguably capable of identifying the central core of a theory, 
something he regards as necessary to understand whether a “structure” altered throughout 
time still could be characterized as the same theory or not (Ibid., p. 7).1 
Notice, however, that to regard lineages as “things” means to treat them as 
individuals. This raises a difficult ontological problem. In the biological realm, for instance, 
organisms are usually regarded as individuals. But it does not seem straightforward to 
conceive single lineages, such as species, or bunches of lineages, such as clades, as 
individuals in the same sense. Species and clades are usually regarded as classes, not 
individuals. But recently evolutionary biologists have been arguing that the living world 
contains individuals at levels higher than the organismic. Gould (Ibid., pp. 71, 597-613), for 
example, argues that organisms are not the only biological entities showing the requisite 
properties of Darwinian individuality. These properties include both vernacular criteria 
(definite birth and death points, sufficient stability during lifetime, the nature of true entities 
with boundaries) and more specific Darwinian criteria (production of daughters, inheritance 
of traits). When we consider these properties, it becomes clear that species, for instance, 
can be construed not only as classes, but also qualify as individuals. Therefore, they can 
                                                           
1
 Concerning the relationship between structure and function, a structuralist gives more emphasis to the 
structure of entities and, on the grounds of it, makes inferences about function. A functionalist, in turn, 
focuses on function, and, then, makes inferences about structure. Darwinian theories have been much aligned 
to functionalist thinking, with structuralist approaches usually appearing in anti-Darwinian perspectives. 
Recently, however, a new prospect for combining structuralist and functionalist thinking in Darwinian 
evolutionary thought seems to be emerging through efforts in fields such as evolutionary developmental 
biology. 
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potentially undergo selection (Ibid., p. 72). Generally speaking, lineages can be conceived 
as entities endowed with historical continuity, i.e., as individuals, which are subject to 
selection at several hierarchical levels.  
Now, if we take theories to be historical things, such as lineages, a structuralist 
viewpoint (such as Gould’s) entails that the individuation of any theory should depend on 
the identification of a central core preserved throughout historical changes. Gould locates 
this proposal between two extremes: one, “minimalist” – in which a theory is individuated 
merely by its insertion in a line of historical descent, without regard to any “essence” – yes, 
he blatantly uses the term –, or “shared content”; and another extreme, “maximalist” – 
aiming at an exhaustive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory to be 
individuated (Gould, ibid., p. 7).  
Gould imputes the “minimalist” position to Hull, for whom theories are merely 
tokens related by descent, while the “maximalist” position claims that theories should be 
types. He recognizes something in Hull’s position he is inclined to accept though, namely 
the treatment of theories as ‘things’ or coherent historical individuals (Gould, ibid., id.). He 
disagrees with Hull when the latter argues that, to count as the same theory, it is sufficient 
that two conceptual tokens be part of the same lineage (Hull, 1988, p.17). Gould accepts 
this as a necessary condition for individuating a scientific concept or theory, but not, as 
Hull intends, as a sufficient condition. Gould requires, furthermore, the identification of the 
“morphology” or “idea content” of theoretical lineages (Gould, ibid., p. 8). One should take 
into account “conceptual continuity”, a shared content that constitutes the “essence” of a 
theory, “operationally definable as minimal sets of propositions so crucial to the basic 
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function of a system that their falsification must undermine the entire structure” (ibid., p. 
11). 
Gould attempts, then, the following reductio ad absurdum of Hull’s proposal: 
“... a pure criterion of continuity, imbued with no constraint of content, forces one to 
apply the same name to any conceptual lineage that has remained consciously intact 
and genealogically unbroken through several generations (of passage from teachers to 
students, for example), even if the current ‘morphology’ of concepts directly inverts 
and contradicts the central arguments of the original theory” (ibid., p. 8). 
And he offers an example:  
“Thus, on this account, if the living intellectual descendants of Darwin, as defined by 
an unbroken chain of teaching, now believed that each species had been 
independently created within six days of 24 hours, this theory of biological order 
would legitimately bear the name of ‘Darwinism’ ” (ibid., id.). 
Hull seems to acknowledge this as a possibility: “A proposition can evolve into its 
contradictory” (1988, p. 18). We will come back to this point later. 
Anyway, in Gould’s view this is an unacceptable implication of the “minimalist” 
position: 
“…if I wish to call myself a Darwinian in any fair or generally accepted sense of such 
a claim, I do not qualify merely by documenting my residence within an unbroken 
lineage of teachers and students who have transmitted a set of changing ideas 
organized around a common core [...]. I must also understand the content of this label 
myself, and I must agree with a set of basic precepts defining the broad ideas of [this] 
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view of natural reality [...]. In calling myself a Darwinian I accept these minimal 
obligations […]; but I do not become a Darwinian by the mere default of accidental 
location within a familial or educational lineage” (ibid., p. 9). 
Gould also requires a commitment to the “essence” of Darwinism, which he 
operationally defines by means of three “central features”: Agency, Efficacy, and Scope 
(ibid., pp.12-15, Chap. 2).2 They would constitute the “core” of any “Darwinian” theory, its 
“truly essential claims”, to be distinguished from a “larger set of more peripheral 
assertions” (ibid., 124). These features play in the structure of the Darwinian theory the 
central role of explaining how the abstract mechanism of natural selection – which is surely 
also part of the “essence” of Darwinism – is made concrete in nature.  
It is important to examine how Gould addresses the concept of “essence” in 
evolutionary biology, since his approach to the individuation of theories involves a 
metaphorical extension of this concept to epistemology. He proposes that the term 
“essence” should be reintroduced in biology in a manner that evades an interpretation in 
terms of a Platonic eidos. For Gould (ibid. p. 10.), “... a meaningful notion of essence in 
                                                           
2
 The principle of agency refers to the level (or levels) in the biological hierarchy that is (or are) the locus (or 
loci) of action of natural selection. Darwin claimed that the individual organism is the level in which natural 
selection acts. The principle of efficacy explains what natural selection is able to do. Darwin, for instance, 
insisted that natural selection is not a minor and negative mechanism, capable only of eliminating the unfit, 
but plays a positive role in evolution, producing the fit. The principle of scope concerns the spectrum of 
evolutionary phenomena explainable by natural selection. Darwin argued that the theory of natural selection 
can be extrapolated to explain the whole range of evolutionary phenomena. For details on these principles and 
the debates about them throughout the history of evolutionary thought since Darwin, we refer the reader to 
Gould (2002). 
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biology” should be grounded on the role played in evolution by constraints of structure and 
history, expressed as Bauplans of higher taxa. He argues that a notion of essence 
compatible with current biological thinking becomes more plausible when we consider the 
shifting from the idea of “… a disembodied and nonmaterial archetype employed by a 
creator” to that of a common ancestor. A Bauplan should be understood as “...an actual 
structure (or inherited developmental pathway) present in flesh and blood ancestor – a 
material basis for channeling, often in highly positive ways, the future history of diversity 
within particular phyletic lineages” (ibid., p. 11). 
Can a Bauplan, i.e., the fundamental body plan of organisms, have causal powers? 
Or would it be merely a concept reached by abstracting a set of common structural 
characteristics among organisms? Gould adopts the first stance, claiming that the set of 
particulars is united by these common characteristics into “meaningful relationships of 
common causal structure and genesis” (ibid. id). If Bauplans were only abstract concepts, it 
would be hard to understand in what sense they might “act” as “fundamental building 
blocks”, and, in fact, contain “particular incarnations” (e.g., species) through this mode of 
action or functioning, as Gould proposes. 
We are not sympathetic, however, towards the idea of bringing back the notion of 
“essence” to either biology or epistemology. Although biology needs, to be sure, some 
concept that grasps the structural plan of organisms in its universality – avoiding at the 
same time an appeal to an abstract Platonic eidos -, to name this concept “essence” is not a 
good idea. And the same is true of theories. After all, this term carries over its shoulders the 
weight of meanings incompatible with population thinking. 
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Despite their disagreements, Gould and Hull concur, actually, in a kind of 
evolutionary historicism concerning the nature of theories: both take them to be historical 
entities, as biological species are.3 Biological species are lineages for them, individuals that 
satisfy, as much as more familiar individuals (say, organisms), the criteria for individuality 
spelled out by Gould himself (see above). 
If theories are historical entities as well and a general selectionist framework is 
applied to science, they can be described as evolving, on a par with biological species. This 
is, indeed, Hull’s project. He attempts to articulate an account of selective processes 
sufficiently general and abstract to be able to accommodate a broad range of phenomena, 
including scientific dynamics. His theses about the nature and individuation of scientific 
theories have to be contextualized in his selectionist theory of science, which we address in 
the next section. 
 
3. Hull’s selectionist theory of science 
Gould mentions, in his 2002 book, the first chapter of Hull’s Science as a process 
(1988), especially the section “Conceptual Lineages”, in which the latter proposes his 
“general analysis of selection processes”. 
Hull’s selectionist theory of science presupposes a formulation of the Darwinian 
process so as to make it applicable not only to any possible life form but also to any 
structure, even beyond the biological domain, that might be seen as adapted (or able to 
increase its adaptability). For this purpose, he redescribes in more abstract terms the entities 
                                                           
3
 Hull acknowledges his debt to Toulmin for using the notion of ‘historical entity’ (Hull, 1985, pp. 780-1). 
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involved in the biological evolutionary process, calling them “replicators”, “interactors” 
and “lineages” (henceforth ‘RIL formulation’).  
Replicators and interactors are defined in terms of their functions or causal roles. 
This functionalist description makes it possible to pin down the concrete things playing 
those roles at a particular hierarchical level in a complex system. Since replicators and 
interactors are defined functionally, different things in different systems – or even at 
different hierarchical levels in one particular system – might play these roles. They are 
defined in terms of the abstract selectionist description that has, so to speak, a 
methodological priority, helping to find out the entities (or structures) that realize those 
functions. For lack of space, we will not expand on the RIL formulation as applied to the 
biological realm, but, instead, we will look at which entities, in science, might play the role 
of replicators, interactors, and lineages. 
It's well known that Dawkins called memes the units in conceptual evolution. Hull 
regards a scientific concept a meme, playing the same role as a gene in biological systems - 
that of a replicator.4 A conceptual system (in science, typically a theory) is taken to be a set 
of memes that plays the same role as the genotype in biology. 
Hull requires, nonetheless, a material basis for memes. In the case of science, this 
material basis can be the brains of scientists, besides the media used to communicate 
scientific conceptual systems: papers, books, computers, etc.5 Replication occurs by the 
                                                           
4
 Actually, science has different kinds of replicators as “elements of the substantive content of science – 
beliefs about the goals of science, the proper ways to go about realizing these goals, problems and their 
possible solutions, modes of representation, accumulated data reports, and so on” (Hull, 2001b, p. 116). 
5
  Therefore, there is no place in Hull’s theory for an autonomous Popperian “third world”. Cf. Hull (2001b), 
p.33. 
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communication of conceptual systems through those media that play the role of vehicles for 
these memes.  
Hull (1988, pp. 12-3) claims that he is not proposing an evolutionary epistemology. 
Nonetheless, he still addresses the epistemological issue of the appraisal of scientific 
theories when he claims that what corresponds here to the biological phenotype are the 
consequences inferred from theoretical principles – a ‘conceptual phenotype’. These 
consequences are compared to observations that play the role of a selective empirical 
environment. Therefore, conceptual lineages result from the interplay between replicators, 
interactors, and this kind of environment. 
Hull argues that, in a similar way to the expression of the genotype into a biological 
phenotype, much information is lost in those derivations of the consequences of a theory. 
Although just a small subset of all the potential consequences of a theory is effectively 
derived, it is still the case that the theory is tested on the basis of such consequences: “A 
particular experiment or observation bears on only one small part of the meaning of the 
theoretical term” (Hull, 2001b, p.39). In other words, the success or failure in the 
replication of these conceptual systems depends on this slim “interface” between the 
conceptual phenotype and the empirical environment.6 
One implication of Hull’s selectionism is the underdetermination of theory by data 
and the Duhem-Quine thesis:  
                                                           
6
 Analogously, a biological genotype is ‘tested’ through a particular phenotype that expresses just part of its 
possible exemplifications. Genes and genomes “succeed or fail in replicating themselves, depending on a 
relatively small number of actual exemplifications of all possible exemplifications permitted by the 
information they contain”  (Hull, 2001b, p.39). 
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“Only one small aspect of a scientific theory can be tested in a particular 
experimental setup, and the results can always be accommodated in a host of ways 
[…]. There are no absolutely crucial experiments” (ibid. p.40). 
Hull rejects, however, the proposal of looking at the evolution of science as a simple 
change in meme frequencies, in the same way as he (and Gould) rejected a bookkeeping 
view of biological evolution as just a change in gene frequencies – a position known as 
“gene selectionism”. 
Gould’s arguments against gene selectionism are based on the idea that replicators, 
at the genetic level, are basic units of recording, of ‘bookkeeping’, and not causal agents. 
Causality in the evolutionary process takes place, fundamentally, at the level of the 
interaction of biological systems with the environment, and, consequently, units of 
selection should be defined as interactors, not replicators (Gould, 2002, p.622). Gould 
rightly recognizes the great merit of Hull for introducing the distinction between interactors 
and replicators, particularly because it avoids the conflation of recording (‘bookkeeping’) 
and causality, the fundamental logical error of gene selectionism. 
Hull evades ‘bookkeeping’ in biological and scientific evolution alike. The latter is 
not seen just as a change in concepts frequencies. Causal interactions are taken to be as 
fundamental in conceptual evolution as they are in biological evolution: in the former, 
interactions involve the vehicles for the memes– social interactions and also interactions 
with the physical environment. Hull looks for selective mechanisms that might explain 
evolution in science (1988, p.17), therefore he has to take into account causal relations, 
besides logical relations. A meme or conceptual phenotype cannot enter by itself into causal 
interaction with the physical world. We should recognize that theories are necessarily tested 
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through scientists, especially through their experimental apparatuses. If the focus is on 
causation, one has to take into consideration the relevant interactors: 
“Omitting reference to the interaction in conceptual change leaves out not only the 
testing part of conceptual change but also the tester – in cases of science, the 
scientist” (2001b, p.42).  
Therefore, Hull is not just proposing a kind of memetics in the realm of scientific 
change.7 In the next section we will analyze some implications of adopting a selectionist 
framework like Hull’s: 
(i) the test and replication of theories have a local and, to some degree, accidental 
character, depending on various historically contingent issues, like the lineages of scientists 
the theories are associated with. The “origin” of theories is, therefore, a chief concern; 
                                                           
7
 Notwithstanding, Hull rejects explicitly, in his 2001 book, a thesis he used to admit before – that scientists 
play a role analogous to biological interactors. He is here replying to critiques that pointed to some important 
disanalogies in this regard. Genes code for biological interactors, but we cannot say that ideas (or, more 
generally, memes) code for scientists. It is also true that, as Hull argues, the “differential extinction and 
proliferation” of scientists would not cause by itself the extinction and proliferation of memes, what is the 
case in actual interactors. It is also the case that some scientists just pass on memes without trying to test 
them, playing only the role of passive vehicles. In our view, it is difficult, however, to completely reject the 
idea that scientists play also the role of interactors, that is, of “agents that facilitate interaction” (ibid., p.4). 
We should, in this context, mention a critique we find in many authors (e.g. Sterelny, 1994; Grantham, 2000), 
namely that Hull completely ignores, in his selectionist theory of science, the cognitive processes in 
individual scientists. In this sense, his theory is not as embodied as we would expect. We will propose, at the 
end of the paper, a way to graft this cognitive dimension into Hull's selectionist account of scientific change. 
It might be fruitful, on this issue, to compare Hull's theory with Popper’s or Campbell’s evolutionary 
epistemologies. 
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(ii) the local processes relevant for explaining conceptual evolution in science 
comprise the particular methods, models, idealizations, instrumentations, etc. employed by 
scientists to bridge the gap between theories and the empirical world. We should look for 
actual inferences made by scientists, not for possible inferences, as philosophers of science 
usually do. 
 
4. Theories as historical entities 
Hull applies “population thinking” to the history of ideas, just as he does with 
regard to the individuation of biological species:  
“... if conceptual change is to be viewed from an evolutionary perspective, concepts 
must be treated in the same way. In order to count as the ‘same concept’, two term-
tokens must be part of the same conceptual lineage. Population thinking must be 
applied to thinking itself” (Hull, 1988, p.17). 
According to Hull, as far as conceptual systems such as theories are evolving 
entities, they have the ontological status of individuals, of tokens in conceptual lineages. 
Whenever a scientist comes up with a theory, she always expects it to be sufficiently 
general (to be taken as a type) and accepted across the board. Hull asserts that this 
purported generality is lost, though, whenever the theory is tested and transmitted to other 
scientists. What is actually replicated is not a type but just tokens: 
“... Term-tokens are tested and transmitted locally but interpreted globally as types. 
[…]. Each generation of scientists intends for their conceptual systems to be 
generally applicable and universally accepted, but in each generation only a very 
 17
small percentage of instances of these systems gets passed on, and the version of a 
particular conceptual system that eventually comes to prevail may well not be the one 
that early scientists intended” (Hull, 2001b, p.131; cf. 1988, p.506). 
Hence, one way of seeing the divergence between Hull and Gould concerning the 
topic of the nature and individuation of scientific theories is that the first gives priority to a 
‘phylogenetic framework’, in which descent takes priority to similarity (Hull, 1985, p.778). 
Gould focuses instead on similarities anchored to a morphological type, reconceptualized as 
an inherited structure or developmental pathway. The relevance of structuralist thinking 
seems to be, indeed, a key point of disagreement between them:  
“Instead of treating the historically unrestricted types as constituting the general 
framework in which conceptual change is investigated, as is usually done, an 
evolutionary analysis takes a phylogenetic framework as basic; then conceptual types 
are periodically fitted into the interstices of this tree” (Hull, 2001b, p.41). 
Adopting this phylogenetic framework, in which theories are treated as conceptual 
lineages, it becomes conceivable that, in the long run, versions of the same evolving theory 
may contradict each other. This is an unacceptable consequence for Gould. While Hull goes 
on to articulate the far-reaching and sometimes counter-intuitive consequences of his 
selectionist approach, Gould attempts, actually, to save our common-sense intuitions 
regarding theories – according to which they are types, not just tokens –, although this 
raises difficulties of its own, as we will point out in section 6. 
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Hull admits that conceptual/linguistic tokens that contradict each other might 
pertain to the same conceptual lineage, given the necessary heterogeneity of conceptual 
lineages and the fact that they are “loose” and can change indefinitely through time: 
"At any one time, they can contain contradictory elements, and a particular statement-
token can give rise through successive replications to a statement-token that 
contradicts it" (ibid., p.127). 
Hull does not see in this, however, a reductio of his theory – as Gould does – but a 
necessary consequence of taking seriously the thesis that scientific dynamics is an 
evolutionary process. An analogous situation is observed in biological evolution: 
sometimes there is more heterogeneity within a particular lineage than between that lineage 
and its close relatives (ibid., p.126)! 
But it is undeniable that there are problems here: given this heterogeneity, how can 
we name or refer to a conceptual lineage in a ‘non-ambiguous’ way? How can we group 
different tokens, despite their differences, and claim that they are ‘of the same type’? 
 
5. Conceptual lineages and the type specimen method 
To deal with the problem of naming a heterogeneous conceptual lineage, Hull 
proposes the application of the same method used by systematists to name a biological 
species. When a specimen of an unknown biological species is discovered by a systematist, 
she gives a name to it, and that name is subsequently used to name all individuals of the 
same species. This specimen now represents, in a certain way, the species. Even if the 
specimen is not really typical, it keeps being the reference for the name of the species. The 
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systematists communicate to each other the specimen and the name associated with it. By 
using this type specimen method, a name refers rigidly to a species (or to a lineage), despite 
the modifications the organisms pertaining to it may undergo as a consequence of 
evolution. 
Hull strongly suggests that the type-specimen method can be used to individuate 
any historical entity, including theories, in order to solve the problem of the heterogeneity 
within a lineage. For instance, to give a name to a particular version of a theory (say, to call 
it a “Darwinian theory”), we have to locate it in a certain lineage, by tracing back the causal 
links of transmission of conceptual-theoretical tokens. The naming is not based on any 
shared content (or meaning), abstractly characterized, as Gould proposes, but just on 
descent. 
In this context, Hull criticizes how the problem of meaning has usually been 
addressed, i.e., in terms of just abstract relations between words and concepts. He tells apart 
two ways in which different instances of a term (two term-tokens) might be grouped:  
a) Grouping based on similarity of meaning (content), without taking into account 
historical links, i.e., descent. By adopting this approach, two term-tokens are subsumed 
under the same type if they have the same (or similar) meanings. Types in this case refer to 
meaning, to abstract concepts; historical genesis is considered irrelevant for the grouping; 
b) Grouping based on descent, on causal chains of replication and transmission. 
Two term-tokens are grouped if they pertain to the same lineage, to the same “sequence of 
replicators”, notwithstanding possible (and expected) meaning change (for instance, 
changes in the way the terms are “connected to their referents”). In this case, we have 
“identity by descent” (Hull, 2001b, pp.130-1). 
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As far as one is concerned with the way terms and concepts evolve, the second way 
of grouping term-tokens is the relevant one, according to Hull: “If one wants to treat 
conceptual change as a selection process, then term-tokens must be grouped into lineages 
and trees by means of transmission” (Ibid., p.131).  
He recognizes the relevance, in certain contexts, of the first way of grouping, but 
argues that people and the historical processes in which they are engaged have necessarily 
to be included into the picture, since words get meaning through them – real agents 
partaking in causal interactions. 
Going back to scientific dynamics, Hull acknowledges that “both ways of grouping 
term-tokens have their function in science” (ibid. id.). However, if one is concerned with 
the evolution of scientific theories, i.e., with a natural process, the second way should be 
prefered to group versions of theories.8 
                                                           
8
 It is pretty consensual to distinguish homoplasies from homologies, as far as biological cases are considered. 
To subsume particular tokens in a type due to an assumption of common descent is a serious mistake when 
one is dealing with homoplasies. Nonetheless, Hull certainly recognizes that the latter way of grouping has a 
function in biology, as elsewhere, depending on the question that is being asked. Furthermore, the RIL 
description is taken by Hull as a requirement for the proposal of laws in biology, precisely because 
“replicators” and “interactors” are conceptual types in contrast with other concepts that have been used in this 
science (like those of “gene”, “organism”, and “species”), which are not (Hull, 2001b, p. 40). What about 
conceptual evolution? Hull emphasizes that homoplasies should be here distinguished from homologies as 
well. Is there also a place for types in this kind of process? Hull is inclined to answer affirmatively to this 
question: to explain this cultural process we attempt to instantiate a general selectionist theory of the same 
kind we successfully applied to explain biological processes (Hull, 2001b, p. 41). Although Hull is not wholly 
explicit on this, the status of his general selectionist theory is, however, the same as that of any scientific 
theory. It is a historical entity, submitted to the very same processes of replication, selection and transmission 
 21
It is also important for this way of grouping to keep track of the lineage of scientists 
who test, replicate, and transmit these theoretical versions. In effect, Hull insists that 
conceptual lineages and lineages of scientists should be “followed separately” (ibid., 
p.127). Both lineages have much heterogeneity and are submitted to changes in time. 
Hull’s approach is able to deal with the historical possibility that different names be 
associated with different theoretical versions in the same lineage: these term-tokens can be 
grouped the same way we group what they refer to. Theoretical versions and their names 
are both seen as historical entities: 
“The type-specimen method works so well for historical entities because both the 
entity being named and the subsequent link-to-link transmission of its name form 
historical entities that can be traced independently of meaning change to see if, in the 
past, they intersect in the way claimed” (ibid., pp.128-9). 
Summing up: theoretical versions should be grouped by descent, by keeping track of 
the relevant replication and transmission events. One can name the same way any two 
versions, despite their conceptual differences, if they pertain to the same unbroken 
evolutionary lineage. 
 
6. Gould, Hull and historicism in the philosophy of science 
As we saw, Gould adopts a structuralist perspective while addressing conceptual 
change. It is not clear, however, if this structuralist thinking is indeed compatible with 
historicism and, especially, with an evolutionary view of theoretical dynamics. As we said 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
it postulates for other theories. Therefore, we should expect that it will also evolve, like Darwinian theory, for 
that matter. We hope this paper will take part in this process!  
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before, from a viewpoint like Gould’s, we have to identify a central core of a theory in 
order to individuate it, despite the historical changes it might undergoe. This takes us 
straight to the topic of the nature of scientific theories and their structure.  
Hull’s selectionist approach has evident metaphysical implications for this topic. He 
acknowledges that “most contemporary philosophers” conceive theories as sets of axioms 
(Hull, 1995, p.209). This, he argues, makes theories a-temporal entities. Therefore, he 
opposes two views of theories: a) theories as sets of axioms; b) and theories as historical 
entities (ibid., p.210): 
“Conceptual systems as historical entities are the units of appraisal in most versions 
of the new philosophy of science. That a selection mechanism for conceptual change 
also requires conceptual systems to be treated as historical entities is yet another 
reason to treat them that way” (Hull, 1982, p.498). 
Even historicist trends in the philosophy of science look, however, for something 
immutable in dynamic-theoretical entities. Hull’s selectionist stance is an invitation to look 
at theories as historical entities in a more radical sense: they are “protean” and there can be 
a “total changeover in their elements” (Hull, 1982, p.479); still, they can pertain to the same 
lineage and, therefore, be named the same way. Therefore, Hull’s selectionist historicism 
should be distinguished from more conventional forms of historicism in the philosophy of 
science, which presuppose immutable cores for individuating theories, or more inclusive 
units of knowledge, like scientific research programs. 
Hull rejects, in fact, the idea that any scientific theory (actually any historical entity) 
has an essence. Gould tries, instead, to reconcile mutability and immutability in a way 
similar to more conventional historicist philosophies of science. Despite his indisputable 
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evolutionary inclinations, Gould is not ready to accept that we can keep naming a 
conceptual system the same way if there is a “total turnover” of its elements, even if it is an 
element of an identifiable conceptual lineage. This indicates that he has a distinctive notion 
of the properties of historical entities, with an emphasis on the idea of Bauplans. 
Gould does not articulate a consistent Darwinian conception about the nature of 
scientific theories, despite the original way he borrows the notion of channeling to apply it 
to the epistemological domain. If there is in Gould’s approach an attempt to apply a 
Darwinist perspective to the problem at stake, it does not seem to be totally conscious. This 
prevents him from extracting the far-reaching consequences of the ideas he advances.  
What, in the philosophical literature, might correspond to Gould’s understanding of 
Bauplans, as applied to the dynamics of theories? We think of the notion of “analogy”, 
proposed initially by N. R. Campbell (1920) and developed by Mary Hesse and other 
philosophers. In the 1950s and 1960s, they were looking for alternatives to the so-called 
“received view” about theories. A conceptual Bauplan, in Gould’s sense, looks pretty much 
like Campbell’s analogy, since its role is that of providing a “channeling” of scientific 
activity. Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm” (understood as a set of exemplars) also plays this 
role and can be included, retrospectively, in the same lineage of philosophical ideas as 
Campbell’s.9  
Gould’s approach looks also similar to Lakatos’ (1978) construal of scientific 
research programs, particularly with regard to the notions of “hard core”, “negative 
heuristics”, and “positive heuristics”. Something akin to a negative heuristics and a hard 
core would follow from Gould’s observation that theories present inherent “essences”, 
                                                           
9
  For a development of this argument, see Abrantes (1998, 2004). 
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operationally defined as sets of minimal propositions, the falsification of which would 
undermine the whole structure. Also, something like a positive heuristics is suggested by 
Gould’s remark that this minimal set of propositions is “... so necessary as an ensemble of 
mutual implication that all essential components must work in concert to set the theory’s 
mechanism in smooth operation as a generator and explanation of nature’s order” (Gould, 
2002, p.11).  
We should not go too far in drawing parallels between Gould’s considerations and 
Lakatos’ theory of science. After all, their motivations for addressing the problems of the 
nature and individuation of theories are fundamentally different. Lakatos was concerned 
with scientific rationality, a philosophical problem not really central to Gould. The latter 
deals with these issues from a scientific perspective, as a way of addressing a circumscribed 
issue in evolutionary biology. 
Even though the similarities between Gould’s and Lakatos’ approaches might be 
seen as merely superficial, we want to highlight that Hull explicitly rejects a Lakatosian 
hard core as a solution to the problem of conciliating immutability and conceptual change. 
He insists that hard cores and essences are the result of retrospective philosophical 
reconstructions (a point Lakatos himself admitted, by the way). Still more fundamentally, 
hard cores cannot explain the actual dynamics of historical entities like scientific theories. 
A selectionist approach like Hull’s brings forth the intricacies of causal relations involving 
replicators, interactors and environments. 
 
7. Population thinking, variation, and scientific change 
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If theories are historical entities, it is expected that they exhibit significant changes 
as time goes by. Furthermore, as Hull asserts, many variations can also be detected 
synchronically: the versions of a theory adopted by the relevant scientific community at a 
given point in time constitute a population with great heterogeneity. This variation is, 
actually, a necessary condition for a genuine evolutionary process, be it in science or 
elsewhere. 
Hull takes seriously population thinking in his understanding of scientific change. 
Replying to a remark by Dawson on the “protean” character of a philosophy called 
“Darwinism”, Hull says: 
“I […] insist that Darwinism is not the only philosophy that is “protean”. Every 
conceptual system, to the extent that it is successful, is just as protean. The only 
research programs that can possibly have an essence, a set of tenets that all and only 
the advocates of that program hold, are those that fall stillborn from the press or 
degenerate into ideologies. No matter what strategy one uses to pin down conceptual 
systems, they always succeed in slithering off the point before one’s very eyes” (Hull, 
1985, p.776). 
From a population thinking perspective, one expects great variability in the 
theoretical versions adopted by the scientific community at any given point in time. This 
heterogeneity typically increases with time (Hull, 2001b, p.127; 1995, p.196), what raises 
the troublesome problems we started addressing in sections 4 and 5: if theories are 
“protean” and there is no immutable core in a conceptual lineage, how can they be 
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individuated and named? Can Hull meet Gould’s critique of the “metaphysics”10 of 
scientific theories which derives from this population perspective? 
Hull suggests that Kuhn’s notion of 'exemplar' might help in this regard, if 
conveniently reinterpreted. A set of solved problems in a scientific research tradition can be 
taken as a type-specimen and used, as exemplars, to name a whole theoretical lineage, very 
much in the same way as a particular organism can be used to name a biological species: 
“One possible interpretation of Kuhn’s notion of an exemplar is that it is designed to 
function as a type specimen. Even though scientific change is extremely complicated 
and at times diffuse, one still might be able to designate particular theories by 
reference to ‘concrete problem-solutions’, as long as one realizes that these 
exemplars have a temporal index and need not be in any sense typical…” (Hull, 
1995, p.210; cf. 1988, pp.113-4). 
The function intended to be played by exemplars in Hull’s type specimen method is 
not the same as in Kuhn’s theory, though. In particular, exemplars do not have to be 
“exemplary” and they do not have to be “similar to their exemplifications”, as Kuhn 
required (Hull, 1982, p.491). 
Furthermore, to be a lineal descendent, a representation should have, in Hull’s 
approach, the required causal linkages to the chosen exemplar. We already emphasized the 
central role that causal relations play in the individuation of scientific theories, according to 
an approach like Hull’s: two versions of a theory are said to be versions of the same theory 
only if they descend from one another. Hull emphasizes that “descent is, after all, a causal 
                                                           
10
 This term is Hull’s. The title of chapter 4 of his 2001 book is: “A mechanism and its metaphysics”. Hull 
intends that chapter to be a summary of his 1988 book. 
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relation” (1988, p.448). Just similarity of structure is neither a sufficient condition to make 
this individuation, nor even necessary, as it is for Gould! We can conceive of theories (or 
sets of problem-solutions, for that matter) which are similar but can't be individuated as the 
same theoretical lineage, if we fail to retrace the relevant causal linkages. If a bunch of 
theories satisfy these linkages by descending from each other, they should be named, 
nonetheless, the same way even if they might be contradictory. 
In Hull’s scheme, to individuate a scientific theory, we have not only to keep track 
of a “conceptual historical entity” but also of a “social historical entity” (in this case, a 
lineage of scientists) and the interconnections between them.11 Differently, the social 
dimension of science is not taken into consideration in Gould’s account of the individuation 
of scientific theories. He is not concerned, for that matter, with the role played by scientists 
in an evolutionary scientific change. 
A striking difference between Hull and Gould is that the latter is not interested in 
explaining the evolutionary dynamics of scientific theories, taken as historical entities. As a 
consequence, he does not address explicitly the relevant causal processes.  
 
8. The structure of theories and evolutionary change: a semantic approach 
It is a good old principle of philosophical methodology that philosophers have 
ultimately to come to grips with commonsense intuitions. We are, more often than not, 
wrong about our intuitions, but Hull apparently accepts that principle when he compares the 
view of the nature of theories championed by logical empiricists with his own proposal: 
                                                           
11
 Several commentators pointed out difficulties, however, in putting together the two “pillars” (Grantham, 
2000) of Hull’s selective theory of science: the social and the conceptual. 
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“Viewing theories as sets (or clusters) of axioms does considerable damage to our 
intuitions about scientific theories. On this interpretation, most examples of scientific 
theories degenerate into unrelated formulations. Viewing scientific theories as 
historical entities also results in significant departures from our usual modes of 
conception. Perhaps scientific theories really cannot be interpreted as historical 
entities. If so, then this is just one more way in which conceptual evolution differs 
from biological evolution. The more these disanalogies accumulate, the more 
doubtful the entire analogy becomes” (Hull, 1995, p.210). 
The received view (also known as the “syntactic view”) has a counter-intuitive 
consequence: the outcome of a theoretical change is, more often than not, a “formulation” 
that cannot be logically related to the previous one. Hull acknowledges, nonetheless, that 
his own view also departs significantly “from our usual modes of conception”. Maybe in a 
confrontation with our intuitions it fares no better than viewing theories as sets of axioms. 
Does Hull have the resources to make us revise our intuitions about the nature of scientific 
theories?  
He does not systematically articulate a position about the structure of scientific 
theories that might be compatible with his selectionism. Hull is, nonetheless, far more 
explicit than Gould concerning the implications of his evolutionary approach to this topic, 
which is central to contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. We think further 
work is required for integrating Hull’s type-specimen proposal for naming theories as well 
as the mechanisms put forth to explain the evolution of these historical entities, on the one 
hand, and a consistent view of their structure, on the other. 
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As we pointed out in the last section, Hull appropriates Kuhn’s notion of 'exemplar' 
in an attempt to deal with some of the troublesome implications of his general selectionist 
approach to conceptual change. In what follows, we want to work out his insights 
concerning the structure of scientific theories.  
First, we would like to emphasize that exemplars are just one of the elements of a 
disciplinary matrix in Kuhn. He distinguishes the roles played by models and exemplars, 
even if this is not as clear-cut as we might expect (Abrantes, 1998). In a nutshell, exemplars 
are defined by Kuhn as concrete problem solutions. Models provide, instead, preferred 
analogies to the scientific community. We will bring to focus the latter element – models – 
and indicate how it might be integrated into Hull’s selectionist framework.  
In his more recent papers, Hull suggests that a semantic view of the structure of 
scientific theories is able to deal better with the selective nature of conceptual change than 
the received view. We will give here just some indications of how this might be fruitfully 
developed by adopting the semantic view as articulated by Giere (1988, 2001), in which 
theories are reconstructed as a hierarchy of models. 
If a theory is reconstructed this way, instead of as a set of axioms, a particular 
version of a theory can be conceived as a bunch of models. Models are usually conceived 
as more concrete things than theories and, therefore, are more apt to play a local role in 
selection and in replication sequences (in the sense of being tokens, and not types) than 
more abstract entities:  
“Global systems are tested only in the form of ‘versions’. What makes something a 
‘version’ is not just similarity in structure. Descent is also required. Theories are best 
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interpreted as families of models but these families have a necessary genealogical 
dimension” (Hull, 2001b, p.40). 
The semantic view might be able to further clarify how different scientists solve 
different problems using different models and still be part of the same social lineage and 
contribute to the same conceptual lineage. Instead of a population of theories, we would 
have an evolving population of models connected through causal relations of descent. 
In section 4 we first remarked that scientists usually interpret scientific terms as 
being genuinely general – i.e., as types that gather similar tokens. One implication of 
looking at theories as historical entities in Hull's radical sense is that since “only a few 
tokens actually get transmitted” (ibid., p. 41), the alleged generality of theories is lost in 
this process. By applying the semantic conception of theories, we are able to look at those 
tokens as models - what scientists communicate and replicate are bunches of models. 
 
9. Hull, Gould, and a philosophical conundrum 
The semantic view of theories, if allied with Hull’s selectionism, might also 
eventually contribute to explain away a problem much discussed by philosophers: that of 
the incommensurability of theories. 
Hull’s diagnosis is that philosophical reconstructions of the products of scientific 
practice in terms of deductive inferences led to intractable (and spurious) problems, such as 
that of the purported insurmountable gaps in communication between scientists with 
different theoretical commitments. In reality, these commitments are usually too messy and 
complex for this kind of philosophical reconstruction to have any bearing on scientific 
activity. 
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Hull argues that scientists who disagree over fundamentals can still understand each 
other and collaborate:  
“… incommensurability is one of those rarefied, in-principle problems that seem 
important to those working on general semantic theories but seldom cause any 
problems in actual practice” (Hull, 1988, p.495). 
The received view of scientific theories is one of those philosophical constructs that 
generate those “in-principle” problems: 
“According to the logical empiricist analysis of science, scientific theories are totally 
explicit, perfectly precise inferential systems. Either a statement is derivable from a 
particular theory or it is not. The conflict between two different theories must be 
needle sharp or nothing. Given the high level of precision assumed in this conception, 
slight differences in meaning can make a difference. But scientific theories as they 
function in science are much cruder…” (ibid., pp.494-5). 
Kuhn certainly contributed to dismantle the logical empiricists’ view of scientific 
knowledge. Among the important points he made, we find the claim that scientific practice 
does not require one to follow explicit rules, and that it has a tacit dimension (an idea he 
took from Polanyi). It is surprising that, despite these ideas, he fell into the trap of 
incommensurability and, actually, helped bringing to the forefront those rather artificial and 
unusual situations in which it might arise.  
Hull criticizes the monolithic and uniform character of a paradigm as portrayed by 
Kuhn. If a scientific community shows, in a tradition of normal science, such an uniformity, 
the passage from one paradigm to another, not surprisingly, looks entirely “arrational” 
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(Hull, 2001b, p.43). Hull insists that intra- and inter-community variability is not only 
necessary for conceptual evolution, but a way out of this philosophical conundrum: 
“… once one acknowledges that considerable differences of opinion can exist within 
any socially defined community, the radical differences in kind between intragroup 
and intergroup communication disappear” (ibid. id.). 
Conceptual heterogeneity is not an obstacle for communication and collaboration 
between scientists. In particular, collaboration can take place even if scientists do not mean 
“the same things by the terms they use” (ibid., p.42). 
Kuhn is an acknowledged chief influence on Hull’s work (1988, p.522). But he 
appropriates ideas like that of “exemplar” in a highly idiosyncratic way: 
“The role of concrete problem solutions is to allow scientists to move from one 
conceptual scheme to another in the absence of any explicitly formulated deductive 
connections. After all, if two systems are genuinely different, one cannot be a 
deductive consequence of another” (ibid., p.112; cf. p.289). 
Kuhn never claimed that concrete problem solutions allow scientists "to move from 
one conceptual scheme to another". Exemplars play a role in normal science only. Kuhn 
overemphasized incommensurability, blocking the way to the possibility, imagined by Hull, 
that exemplars might facilitate navigation through different conceptual systems. 
Can a semantic view of the structure of scientific theories help in understanding the 
grounds for collaboration between scientists and, also, in circumventing 
incommensurability? Applying this view, theoretical variability inside a community or 
between different communities would correspond to different families of models being 
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used by different scientists to solve their problems. A particular version of a theory can 
“overlap” another version by sharing models (i.e., by sharing conceptual tokens).   
Effectively, Hull emphasizes that continuity (besides cohesion) is a necessary 
property of lineages: 
“Lineages are also individuals but of a special sort. Lineages are peculiar in that the 
organization which they exhibit is sufficiently loose so that they can change 
indefinitely through time but sufficiently tight that the effects of selection are not 
lost” (Hull, 2001b, p.112). 
A question that remains to be answered is the following: Do a family of models 
have the kind of cohesion and continuity required for them to be treated as historical 
entities, lineages, in Hull’s sense? If we accept more inclusive conceptual units, like Kuhn’s 
disciplinary matrices, two conceptual units might share elements of these matrices: 
symbolic generalizations, models, exemplars. If this is the case, we may cash out, after all, 
Gould’s requirement of shared content, even though not at a global level. 
 
10. Gould’s reductio ultimately fails, but a nuanced structuralism should be grafted 
onto Hull’s minimalism  
We are now better equipped to deal with the question we posed in section 2, 
concerning Gould’s alleged reductio of Hull’s approach to the nature and individuation of 
scientific theories. 
Let us consider the situation Gould describes: a group of scientists, connected by a 
genealogically unbroken series of generations with original Darwinians, develops a version 
of Darwinism that contradicts central tenets of the original version. The reductio would 
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follow from the idea that we could not consider this group as being composed by 
Darwinians, but Hull’s position would force us to do so. 
From the arguments we elaborated throughout this paper, we can draw the 
conclusion that Gould is not successful in his reductio of Hull’s stance. What Gould’s 
argument really does is to take a snapshot of the moment, in Hull’s account, in which a new 
theoretical lineage would be generated out of a previous one. By adopting the semantic 
approach, the picture we have is of a population of models which gradually changes 
through processes described in the RIL formulation. Eventually, this process of change in a 
conceptual lineage may result in a version of a theory which contradicts elements of an 
earlier theoretical version. 
Hull characterizes historical entities as “…spatio-temporally localized particulars 
that develop continuously through time while staying internally cohesive. Historical entities 
may undergo total turnover of their constituent elements just so long as they do so 
gradually and remain sufficiently cohesive in the process” (1986, p.17). 
Hull’s theory of science requires similarity relations which hold only at the local 
level, and, therefore, through a long series of events of communication of models, the local 
similarity between theoretical versions can be ultimately lost at the global level. Thus, 
rather different, even contradictory theoretical tokens can still be part of the same lineage. 
But, then, heterogeneity within a lineage of scientists comes to the forefront, and, 
consequently, the problem of communication of models between different groups of 
scientists. If these groups are yet communicating their models with each other, the causal 
linkages are preserved, and they should be treated as pertaining to the same lineage. If they 
do not exchange their models to a significant extent anymore – as the contradiction between 
the models makes it likely to happen –, what we will have before our eyes is an analog of a 
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speciation event in biological evolution: an ancestor family of models will give rise to 
descendant families. We believe that these ideas give us the means to avoid Gould’s 
reductio. 
If we take a snapshot of this process of change, as we believe Gould does, then we 
will have an apparent reductio of Hull’s position. Nevertheless, we would have simply 
grasped a moment of separation of one family of models into two descendant families, i.e., 
of one conceptual lineage into two descendant lineages, due to a break in the 
communication of models between groups of scientists. As in biological evolution, the old 
family of models would be regarded as a common ancestor, from that point on giving rise 
to two fairly distinct families. Obviously, one of these families may go extinct, and in the 
end it may seem as if the ancestor theory/lineage simply turned into a new position which 
contradicts itself. But to conceive the nature of theories as being historical entities should 
not entitle us to construe their evolution as a single, unidirectional line in time. On the 
contrary, if we subsume an account of scientific evolution under a general selectionist 
framework, we should have dichotomies in our tree of theories. We expect in the long run 
to have “speciation” and the generation of new theories. It is true that from an evolutionary 
point of view all these boundaries are fuzzy, even if one requires, like Hull, that lineages 
should be “sufficiently tight”. 
What Gould takes as a reductio of Hull’s position is precisely the sort of event the 
latter describes as a “bottleneck”. Bottlenecks in conceptual evolution are related to the 
importance of small research groups (2001b, pp.131-2; 1988, p.156). As in the case of the 
founder effect in biological evolution, a small research group that develops a theory which 
contradicts most models of the lineage to which it was causally linked, will give rise to a 
new family of models. This new lineage will not have the same characteristics of the 
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ancestor, since its founders will bear only a fraction, if any, of the variation present in the 
original family of models. As founder groups of new biological populations, founders of 
new scientific theories represent a statistically biased population of conceptual versions. 
Here, causal relations involving scientists as vehicles of theoretical versions (or bunches of 
models) are crucial for individuating lineages (of scientists and conceptual units), besides 
inferential relations (broadly conceived). 
Therefore, a change from a previous family of models to a new one will look, 
retrospectively, like a leap in the evolutionary process (just as it can happen in biological 
evolution). In sum, it seems to us that the observation that a given scientific theory evolved 
into its contradictory can be explained in the same manner as we explain the lack of 
transitional links between two species by means of the founder effect. It is not a case of 
linear evolution, in which we might talk about theories evolving into contradictory 
propositions, but rather a branching evolution, in which we can picture ancestor theories 
giving rise to new families of models – replicated by new groups of scientists –, some of 
which will not share substantial content with the original theory, but will be, nonetheless, 
historical descendants of the latter lineage. 
A selectionist approach to science cannot dispense with similarity relations, as Hull 
claimed it ought to, but these relations will hold only at the local level, i.e., at each event of 
communication of models, while at the global level, rather different versions of models can 
be part of the same lineage. These hints show that a problem Hull pointed out a long time 
ago is still with us: 
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“Specifying the relations that integrate distinct replication sequences into conceptual 
systems and distinguish different conceptual systems from each other remains the 
chief piece of unfinished business of the ‘new philosophy of science’ ” (Hull, 1982). 
A semantic conception of the structure of scientific theories might, after all, bring to 
focus not only Gould’s and Hull’s divergences but, eventually, show a way to combine 
their approaches to conceptual change! A version of the semantic view called 
“structuralism” can be likened to some of Gould’s  theses, especially those related to a 
possible analog, in the case of theories, of the notion of Bauplan, as well as his essentialism 
(Díez & Moulines, 1997; Lorenzano & Díez, 2002). 
If structuralism is consistently applied to the conceptual realm, it should point to a 
material substrate and to concrete entities that are able to bear causal powers and, 
consequently, to generate explanations in this realm. It is not obvious, however, if Gould is 
a consistent structuralist in this aspect, as far as conceptual dynamics is concerned. 
We can think of a reformulation of Hull’s selectionist theory of science that keeps 
its naturalistic emphasis on causality and also assimilates a developmental perspective 
inspired by Gould – in which conceptual Bauplans play negative (constraints) and positive 
(modeling/exemplary problem solving) roles in theory construction. In this new theory of 
science, Kuhn’s exemplars might also be exemplary, providing a channeling, a constrained 
generation of new versions in a theoretical lineage. 
Anyhow, we cannot overemphasize that Hull’s selectionist account of scientific 
activity brings causal relations to the forefront besides the acknowledged role played by 
inferences in traditional philosophy of science. We have to recognize, however, that Hull’s 
theory does not take into consideration the cognitive processes in individual scientists, an 
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element that cannot be missing in any causal account of conceptual change. Addressing 
scientists’ cognitive processes may be a way of integrating Hull’s naturalistic emphasis on 
causality and a role for conceptual Bauplans as constraining factors in conceptual 
development. 
The details of this selectionist-structuralist account of scientific dynamics are yet to 
be filled out. It opens up a whole avenue for research, interestingly in a time in which 
evolutionary biologists are themselves engaged in building a similar sort of integration.  
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